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          Abstract 
This paper describes the assessment criteria that have been identified for use 
within a self-assessment tool for risk reporting within an industrial context. An in-
depth review of the available literature was carried out exposing the criteria 
discussed within this paper. The criteria target all areas of reporting from the 
design of the reporting interface to the cultural considerations and initiatives. 
These criteria will be refined and weighted using industrial case study experience 
and then developed into the full self-assessment tool.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Why Reporting is Important within an Organisation? 
 
Learning from near misses, previous mistakes and operational experience has historically been a 
cornerstone within safety management for as far back as the Heinrich, (1941) hierarchy of 
accident severity where it was shown that for every major incident there were many cases of 
smaller incidents and behind those smaller incidents there were many near misses that can occur 
within the organisation. This concept has remained a key consideration within safety 
management today with more recent models such as the Carter (2006) statistical model for 
accident prevention that suggests that an unidentified incident has both an unknown severity 
and an unknown likelihood and therefore an unknown level of risk to the organisation and the 
process and therefore will pose an unknown risk to the organisation which may in fact be 
critical to the operation  
 
The commonly cited “Swiss Cheese” model by Reason (1998) suggests that an accident is the 
result of a combination of the weaknesses in defence barriers (i.e the holes in the cheese), 
therefore risk reporting can be seen as a methodology to identify the holes in these safety 
barriers. A famous example whereby risks were not adequately appreciated can be found within 
the Chernobyl disaster. In this accident a combination of a lack of operator experience, poor risk 
assessment, management pressure and poor plant design caused the disaster (Pidgeon & 
O’Leary, 2000). During the investigation into the accident, it was found that an almost identical 
situation had been mitigated at a similar power plant, the operators of the plant had reported the 
near miss to the atomic regulatory bodies but both regulators and plant operators did not act on 
their report undermining the whole safety management process (IAEA, 1991). 
 
The lessons from incidents have driven organisations to develop and implement safety 
management systems (SMS). SMS systems take data that has been inputted from a variety of 
sources that can include reports submitted from staff within the organisation. These reports can 
pertain to concerns for safety, suggestions in addition to near misses and incidents. In order to 
improve the amount of “good” data leading into the system, SMS systems are frequently citied 
within accident reports as recommendations that should be implemented within the organisation 
(Leveson, 2011). However previous studies have found that reporting systems on site are 
underutilised and under used (Bhattacharya, 2012; Cromie et al., 2012; Leveson, 2011) 
organisations need to monitor the performance of reporting in order to ensure that a high level 
of reporting is maintained on site within the organisation.  There is a considerable amount of 
literature that exists that looks into the influencing factors of reporting ranging from the design 
of the reporting system and procedure to the cultural elements that have to be considered within 
the process. This guidance does not currently provide a unified best practice and methodology 
which is one of the key inputs of the system.  
 
Why should reporting be assessed with an organisation? 
 
As discussed in the previous section, reporting systems are an important element of safety 
management/ Maintaining compliance is a key concern for all safety critical industries 
(Leveson, 2011) and this therefore causes simple compliance to be cited as the reason for the 
development of Safety management systems and in turn reporting systems. The use of 
regulations being the main motivational factor for reporting can introduce ramifications for a 
reporting system. There is a real risk that an organisation will set up a reporting system in order 
to “tick the box” and then just neglect to act on the data they are inputting which can result in a 
reporting system that isn’t used within the organisation as found within previous industrial 
studies (Cromie et al., 2012; Kongsvik, Fenstad, & Wendelborg, 2012) where the level of 
reporting declined soon after the reporting system was implemented and the opportunity to use 
reporting to reduce the level of risk within an organisation was missed.  
 
In Reason (2004) a safe organisation is described as an organisation whereby there is a large 
amount of knowledge being inputted into Safety Management. A complete lack of reports 
demonstrates an organisation with a low level of risk awareness. In Reason (2004) a safe 
organisation is described as an organisation whereby there is a large amount of knowledge being 
inputted into the SMS. A complete lack of reports demonstrates an organisation with a low level 
of risk awareness. In the statistical model for accident causation developed by Carter and Smith 
(2006) a hazard that is not identified can have both a fully unknown level of severity and 
likelihood and therefore an unknown level of risk. Therefore it is crucial for organisations to 
ensure the reporting system is utilised as much as possible in order to maintain a high level of 
safety knowledge. Despite this there is a tendency for an organization to implement a reporting 
system and then fail to ensure that the system is actually identifying hazards etc. (Cromie et al., 
2012; Leveson, 2011), Reason (2004) argues that a low number of hazard and near miss reports 
are not an indicator of a safe organization but an indicator or an organization that has poor risk 
management. Therefore there is an opportunity to develop a methodology that will allow 
organizations to assess their reporting system. It is proposed to have two areas of assessment, 
one focusing on the individual role within reporting and a second looking at the managerial 
oversight for reporting: 
• Individual focus of reporting – A survey methodology  
• Managerial focus of reporting – A Reporting Self Assessment Tool (R-SAT)  
 
The R-SAT will be a software tool that will allow organizational management to assess the key 
influencing factors of reporting based on the assessment criteria that will be discussed within 
this paper.  
 
Identification of Criteria 
A high level overview of a reporting process was established. This was used to provide 
guidance to assist in investigating the existing literature and case studies to distil the main 
requirements and objectives of reporting systems and use them as the basis of the high level 
evaluation criteria. The criteria identified through this process are shown in Table 1 and a 
discussion on how and where they were identified in the literature is reported in the following 
chapter. Once these categories were established an in-depth literature review was carried out 
and the individual assessment criteria were developed: 
 
Table 1 Assessment Criteria  
Evaluation Criteria Sub Criteria 
Meeting the Requirements of the Regulatory 
Environment 
Regulatory Requirements  
“Good Practice” 
Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of 
reporting Procedure 
Reporting Form Design 
Reporting Procedure  
Provision and value of Feedback Feedback loop To Reporters 
Value of Feedback for the organization 
Value of good catches to the organisation  
Education and Promotion of the Reporting 
System 
Training 
Reporting Awareness 
Motivation Safety Culture 
Stimulation of Reporting 
External Influences from the Industrial sector External factors 
 
 
Identification of Assessment Criteria 
 
Meeting the Requirements of the Regulatory Environment 
 
The Regulatory Environment will vary depending on the industry that is being assessed. 
Typically safety critical industries such as Aerospace and the Process industry have fairly strict 
regulations governing the use of reporting systems within Safety Management. To develop and 
validate the R-SAT it is proposed to develop and validate two regulatory assessment criteria, 
one targeting the (Civil Aviation, 2013; European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013) and the other 
targeting the European Commission (1994) regulations of pharmaceutical good manufacturing 
practise regulations.  
 
 
 
Table 2 Aerospace Reporting Requirements 
Reference Criteria 
4.5.3 The Organisation has a SMS Manual which communicates the SMS policy to 
the whole organisation and provides the following: 
• Scope of the SMS 
• Objectives of the SMS 
• Hazard Identification and Risk Management schemes 
• Incident Investigation and Reporting plans 
• Just Culture policy and Culpability Definitions are propagated to staff 
• The SMS is promoted on site 
5.1 The organisation has a process of on-going hazard identification 
5.1  The organisation has a process of hazard identification and reporting using a 
mixture of reactive and proactive approaches including safety surveys, near 
miss reporting, hazard reporting systems etc. 
6.1.1 Safety audits are implemented to ensure that the SMS is sound in terms of: 
• Adequate staff levels 
• Levels of competency 
• Achievement of Safety Policy and Objectives 
• Effectiveness of interventions and risk mitigations 
6.1.2 Safety and Cultural surveys are used to examine the effectiveness of a specific 
operation and can use: 
• Checklists 
• Questionnaires 
• Interviews 
6.3 The Organisation seeks to improve SMS performance, continuous improvement 
could be achieved through: 
• Proactive and reactive evaluation of day-to-day operations though 
safety audits or surveys 
• Evaluation of an individual’s performance to verify the fulfilment of 
their safety responsibility 
• Change Management 
7.2 Safety Communication, the SMS is propagated by : 
• Policies and Procedures 
• Newsletters, safety bulletins etc. 
• Websites and e-mail 
• Informal workplace meetings etc. 
 
7.2.1 Staff should be familiar with the SMS and the Organisational Safety Culture: 
• Disseminate safety critical information  
• Feedback explains why actions are taken 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 GMP Regulation 
Reference Criteria 
1.8 (vii)  Any significant deviations are fully recorded, investigated with the objective of 
determining the root cause and appropriate correction and preventative action 
implemented  
1.10 (iv) A review of all significant deviation or non-conformances, their related 
investigations and the effectiveness of resultant corrective and preventative 
actions taken 
1.12 Quality risk management is a systematic process for the assessment, control, 
communication and review of risks to the quality of the medicinal produce. It 
can be applied both proactively and reactively. 
 
Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of reporting Procedure  
This concerns the design of the reporting form and the procedures surrounding reporting. There 
has been previous research into design considerations for the reporting form. Shown below in 
Table 4 Reporting System Design the assessment criteria for the form design, considering the ethos 
of reporting, design considerations based on the referenced literature 
 
Table 4 Reporting System Design 
Reference Criteria 
Kongsvik, Fenstad, & 
Wendelborg, (2012) 
Leva et al. (2010) 
 Evans et al., (2006).  
 
 
The reporting system is implemented with a view to reduce additional 
paperwork and ideally should aim to reduce the paperwork reporting staff 
Boeing Airplane 
(2000), Leveson 
(2011) 
The reporting form allows reporters to share information that focuses outside of 
the act of the error including influencing factors such as environmental, 
workload etc.  
Williamsen (2013) The form is constantly reviewed for its suitability for purpose 
Lappalainen et al., 
(2011) 
Efforts are made to ensure that the reporting form is clear concise and to the 
point 
(Johnson, 2002; Leva, 
Cahill, et al., 2010) 
Any electronic reporting forms that are developed are intended to be easily 
accessible  
Leva et al. (2010) 
(Lappalainen et al., 
2011) (DePasquale & 
Geller, 2013; Short & 
Keasey, 1997) 
 
The reporting system is designed in such a way to require a minimum amount 
of time to submit a report. The Organisation monitors the time impact report 
submission has on reporting staff.  
Cohen (2000)  Dekker 
(2012) 
Reports are encouraged to report not through mandatory approaches but out of 
interest for safety. Management actively reinforces this through the reporting 
procedure.  
Dekker (2012) The organisation is moving to a voluntarily reporting system if they are already 
not at the point.  
 
Provision and value of Feedback  
Feedback is commonly cited as one of the key motivational factors towards reporting (S. M. 
Evans et al., 2006; Sue M. Evans et al., 2007; McAfee & Winn, 1989; Reason, 1998; Sanne, 
2008) therefore these criteria will be looking at the provision of feedback within the 
organization 
Reference Criteria 
(S. M. Evans et al., 
2006; Sue M. Evans 
et al., 2007; McAfee 
& Winn, 1989; 
Reason, 1998; 
Sanne, 2008).  
 
 
The Organisation laid out procedures for the delivery and objectives of 
feedback within the organisation   
Williamsen, (2013) The quality of feedback within the organisation is monitored by management 
(Dekker & Stoop, 
2012) 
If a mitigation isn’t available or feasible, then steps are taken to explain to the 
reporter why   
(Douglas, Cromie, 
Leva, & Balfe, 2014) 
There is a feedback loop for reporting within the organisation 
 
Education and Promotion of the Reporting System  
 
These criteria concerns the efforts implemented towards educating reporters and promotion 
initiatives of the reporting system within the organization. These criteria will focus on the 
operational  
 
Reference Criteria 
(Erdoğan, 2011; 
Leveson, 2011) 
 
The Organisation has clear concise guidelines for the use of safety reporting 
within industry  
(Baram & Schoebel, 
2007; Krugh & 
Sommers, 2010; 
Storgård, Erdogan, 
Lappalainen, & 
Tapaninen, 2012) 
The Organisation makes efforts to make staff aware of the importance of 
reporting on site, and avoids target based approaches 
(Cohen, 2000) The organisation has a voluntarily approach to reporting or plans to move to a 
voluntary approach  
(McAfee & Winn, 
1989) 
Positive mitigations are used as an example to encourage more reports 
Douglas et al. (2015) There are efforts to remind staff about the existence of and benefits to the 
reporting system 
 
Motivation  
 
These criteria look into the motivational techniques management can implement to stimulate 
reporting on site focusing on the cultural considerations  
 
Reference Criteria 
(Reason, 1998; 
Waring, 2005; 
Williamsen, 2013) 
 
The organisation has a clear culpability agreement that makes staff aware of 
what types of behaviour and reports are acceptable or not 
Reason, 1998; Waring, 
2005;Clarke (1998b) 
Reports are seen as simply a way to improve safety and not a way to catch 
people out for unsafe behaviour 
Reason, 1998; The Organisation implements an approach to advertise positive mitigations as a 
result of the SMS system 
Waring, 2005;(Clarke, 
1998a; Sue M. Evans 
et al., 2007; Walton, 
2006) 
Efforts are made to break the seniority gradient within the organisation so that 
junior staff have the confidence to report safety concerns and near misses 
involving more senior staff.  
(Smith, 1999) The organisation is avoiding Behavioural Based Safety approaches and is 
instead trying to help instil the attitude that reports improve the safety of 
someone’s working environment and can provide a net benefit to their own 
safety 
 
External Influences on the Organization 
 
These final criteria look at the role of external factors on the organization. These factors can 
range from recent incidents within the industrial sector, litigation problems such as Freedom of 
Information requests. These factors will not be under influence of the management but they can 
have an effect on the reporting system performance 
 
Reference Criteria 
Waring, 2005; (Sue M. 
Evans et al., 2007) 
Efforts are made to protect reports from litigation such as freedom of 
information effects  
(Leveson, 2011) Accidents within the industry are discussed within the organisation and report 
recommendations can be used as a driver for reporting 
(Reason, 1998) The reporting system is developed with cooperation by unions and other 
interest lobbies 
 
Further Work and Conclusions 
 
The assessment criteria discussed in this paper will be further refined using case study 
experience in the Biopharma and Aerospace industries where surveys and semi structured 
interviews have been carried out to help expose additional areas of assessment. In addition the 
case studies will allow the weighting of the assessment criteria to be determined to help assist in 
the development of a quantitative assessment of the organizational reporting culture which 
combined with techniques such as dashboards etc. will allow a safety manager to drill down and 
determine the areas that will need attention and improvement. . 
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